a dominant fi rm. Section IV discusses some complications and practical problems with the identifi cation of monopoly power, and Section V concludes.
II. Monopoly power in economics
Before illustrating a stylized model of monopoly, it will be useful to review a benchmark case of what monopoly is not: perfect competition. In a perfectly competitive industry, there are many relatively small fi rms and many relatively small buyers of a homogeneous product. Competitive fi rms are price takers, meaning that they have no control over the market price; they take the market price as given in their profi t-maximizing calculus. A profi t maximizing fi rm will produce a quantity of goods (call it q*) such that the marginal cost of producing the last unit is exactly equal to the marginal revenue, or in this case, price.
8 Anything less than q* would leave profi t on the table, and anything more would cut into profi t (assuming that marginal cost is increasing in q, as would typically be the case in a competitive industry).
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Perfectly competitive fi rms can easily enter and exit the market. If there are economic (as opposed to accounting) profi ts to be had in a particular market, fi rms will enter and drive the price down until each fi rm earns zero economic profi t. 10 If there are losses, some fi rms will exit and drive the market price up until the remaining fi rms earn zero economic profi t.
There are three major results in a model of perfect competition, and the zero profi t condition is one of them. The other two are market equilibrium and social welfare maximization. Competitive markets tend toward equilibrium, where the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded. This is Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' at work. 11 Competitive markets are characterized by economic effi ciency, or social welfare maximization. Social welfare, in the economic context, quantifi es the total surplus that consumers and producers enjoy when the market price is diff erent from their reservation prices. For most consumers, the market price for a good is less than their perception of the product's inherent value. A good quantifi cation of that value is consumers' maximum willingness to pay, as described by the demand curve. Consumer surplus is the diff erence between the total value that consumers receive from a good and the price they pay. Similarly, producer surplus is the aggregate diff erence between market price and the minimum price at which a given quantity would be produced. Social welfare is the sum of consumer and producer surplus, and it is maximized under perfect competition. This is a consequence of the assumptions that led to market equilibrium: price-taking sellers and buyers, free entry and free exit, homogenous goods, and full information. Figure 4 .1 illustrates a perfectly competitive market, where D represents market demand and S represents market supply. At a price of P 1 and a quantity of Q 1 , the market is in equilibrium. At a price of P 1 , the quantity demanded is precisely equal to the quantity supplied. As a result, there will be no market forces pushing price above or below P 1 . Consumer surplus, the value of Q 1 to consumers net of what they have to pay, is represented by the triangular area abP 1 . Producer surplus, the diff erence between the price received and the sellers' reservation prices, is measured by the triangular area P 1 bc. Social welfare -the sum of consumer and producer surplus -is the triangular area abc. Given the demand and supply curves shown, social welfare is maximized at the competitive equilibrium. Any deviation will reduce social welfare. A monopolized industry is at the opposite end of the competitive spectrum from a perfectly competitive industry. Instead of many small sellers, a pure monopoly exists when there is only one seller. Monopolies may or may not earn positive profi ts, but their eff orts to maximize profi t lead to output decisions that are inconsistent with welfare maximization. A pure monopolist is not a price-taker. The fi rm can choose to produce any via free access quantity along the market demand curve and charge the corresponding price. Much like a competitive fi rm, a monopolist will seek to maximize profi ts by expanding production until marginal cost equals marginal revenue. But since a monopolist is not a price taker, marginal revenue is not a fi xed market price. Formally, marginal revenue is the change in total revenue resulting from a small increase in output. 12 The monopolist aims to maximize profi t. Consider the following profi t function:
is the price at which a given quantity Q is demanded, C(Q) is the monopolist's total cost of producing that quantity, and P is monopolist's profi t. The monopolist will expand output until the incremental profi t from expansion goes to zero:
The term P 1 Q(dP/dQ) is marginal revenue (MR) and dC/dQ is marginal cost (MC). Then the monopolist's profi t maximizing rule is to produce such that:
MR 5 MC Figure 4 .2 illustrates a monopolist's profi t-maximizing price and output. Graphically, MR has the same intercept as demand, but a steeper, more negative slope.
13 Profi t is maximized by producing Q 2 , corresponding to the intersection of MR and MC. The monopoly price is P 2 , which is the maximum price that the monopolist can charge for an output of Q 2 . As long as average cost is less than P 2 , the monopolist will earn a positive economic profi t. In this illustration, the profi t is indicated by the rectangular shaded area in Figure 4 .2. Note that the monopolist's price is higher than P 1 , which is the competitive price. Moreover, the monopolist's output is lower than the economically effi cient output Q 1 . These are the economic symptoms of monopoly. A monopolist will produce less than the socially effi cient quantity of output and charge a supra-competitive price. As a consequence, society incurs a deadweight social welfare loss in the form of forgone surplus. Graphically, this forgone surplus is the triangular area abc. Ineffi ciency, illustrated in Figure 4 .2 by the area of deadweight loss, is the major economic case against monopolization.
14 The monopolist will forfeit economic effi ciency and social welfare in its pursuit of greater profi t for itself. This is not sinister; it is simply the natural result of profi t maximization in the absence of any competition.
In practice, fi rms which are accused of exploiting monopoly power look very diff erent from the fi rm in Figure 4 .2. But even in more complex industrial settings, the exercise of monopoly power typically results in supra-competitive prices and suboptimal output. The ability to exercise monopoly power relies on high barriers to entry and a well-defi ned product (one with few close substitutes). These market features were taken for granted in Figure 4 .2, but monopoly power is considerably weakened in their absence. Section IV describes briefl y the importance of entry barriers and market defi nition in assessing the viability of antitrust claims.
Measuring monopoly power: the Lerner Index
A monopolist diff ers from a perfectly competitive fi rm in its ability to raise price above marginal cost by restricting output. This is the essence of monopoly power: the ability to deviate from the competitive price (i.e., marginal cost) by restricting the quantity produced. Abba Lerner proposed
Deadweight Loss Profit
Note: The monopolist produces Q 2 where MR 5 MC, and sets price (P 2 ) according to the maximum willingness to pay. There is a social welfare loss equal to the triangular area abc. via free access a measure of monopoly power, which now bears his name -the Lerner Index. 15 For Lerner, the degree of monopoly power is the margin by which a monopolist's price exceeds marginal cost, which is the competitive price. The Lerner Index is then defi ned as:
where P is price and MC is marginal cost, evaluated at the monopolist's profi t-maximizing price and output. It is easily shown that the Lerner Index is closely related to another economic concept: the elasticity of demand (h).
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For a pure profi t maximizing monopoly, the Lerner Index is equal to the inverse of the absolute value of h:
The price-cost margin will be smaller if demand is more elastic. This makes sense because a high elasticity of demand indicates that consumers are very sensitive to price changes. As a result, a monopolist will not fi nd it profi table to impose a high markup when demand is relatively elastic. In contrast, when demand is less elastic, consumers are less responsive to price changes, and the monopolist's markup will be larger, as seen in Figure 4 .3. Demand functions D 1 and D 2 equal marginal cost at the same output, Q 1 . The corresponding marginal revenues (MR 1 and MR 2 ) equal marginal cost at a quantity of Q 2 . The profi t maximizing prices, however, are quite diff erent: P 1 is considerably higher than P 2 . This is because D 1 is less elastic than D 2 at Q 2 .
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The Lerner Index is a misnomer, in that it fails as a monotonic measure of monopoly power. The value of l depends on underlying costs and consumer preferences, not the degree to which one fi rm can exclude others from competing. An ideal index of monopoly power would have a ceiling, equal to some unique value for any pure monopoly. By contrast, the Lerner Index will vary even among pure monopolies. For example, a pure monopolist facing a relatively fl at demand may fi nd it optimal to operate where h 5 −5 while another may fi nd it optimal to produce where h 5 −2. Even though both fi rms produce 100 per cent of the output in their respective markets, and therefore, are pure monopolists, the Lerner Index for the fi rst fi rm is 0.2 while it is 0.5 for the second. This can lead to some confusion.
A related source of confusion stems from the fact that monopolists with very diff erent price-cost margins may have the same Lerner Index. This can be shown with a simple example. Suppose that the profi t maximizing price of a souvenir t-shirt is $15 while the marginal cost is $5. Then the price-cost margin is $10. Suppose a monopolist of marble bookends fi nds the optimal price to be $90 while the marginal cost is $30. The price-cost margin is $60. Both monopolists have the same Lerner Index since:
Despite its shortcomings, the Lerner Index is a useful tool for showing the existence of monopoly power, if not the degree. In this sense, the Lerner Index can be used to complement other types of antitrust evidence, like evidence of entry barriers. But one must recognize the ambiguities associated with measuring the magnitude of monopoly power once existence per se has been established.
The monopolist produces Q 2 where MR 5 MC, and sets price (P 2 ) according to the maximum willingness to pay. There is a social welfare loss equal to the triangular area abc. 
III. Dominant fi rms
A well-defi ned industry with only one unregulated fi rm is rare. There are, however, situations that are near monopolies. These usually involve a dominant fi rm that has the lion's share of the market and a so-called competitive fringe, which comprises small fi rms that respond to price announcements of the dominant fi rm just as competitive fi rms respond to market-determined prices. A dominant fi rm will act like a monopolist, choosing output such that marginal cost equals marginal revenue, but with respect to residual demand rather than market demand. Residual demand is the diff erence between the market demand and the competitive fringe supply at any given price. This can be seen with the help of Figure 4 .4. In Figure 4 .4, the market demand curve is represented by D and the supply curve of the competitive fringe is denoted S CF . Note that S CF is the horizontal sum of the marginal cost curves of all fringe fi rms. Absent the competitive fringe, the dominant fi rm would be a pure monopolist and would therefore face the market demand (D) and be able to determine the optimal quantity it would produce and the corresponding price it would charge. Given the presence of the competitive fringe, however, the dominant fi rm must consider how the fringe producers will respond to its price announcement. Thus, the demand that a dominant fi rm faces is not the market demand, but the residual demand (d ), which is the diff erence between the market demand and the supply of the competitive fringe. In short:
The marginal revenue associated with the residual demand is denoted as mr in Figure 4 .4. Now, the dominant fi rm proceeds to maximize its profi ts in the usual way; it produces that output where its marginal cost (MC) equals residual marginal revenue (mr) and sells it for the market clearing price, which is found on the residual demand curve. This output and price are shown in Figure 4 .4 as Q DF and P, respectively. The competitive fringe will respond to this price in a predictable way -by producing Q CF , which is the quantity on S CF that corresponds to a price of P. Together, the dominant fi rm and the competitive fringe supply Q, which is precisely the amount that the market demands at a price of P, i.e., Q 5 Q DF 1 Q CF .
A dominant fi rm sets a lower price than a pure monopolist would have set, and accordingly, the Lerner Index will be lower for a dominant fi rm than it would have been absent the competitive fringe. This makes sense, since we would expect the residual demand to be more elastic than the market demand. Let h r represent the elasticity of residual demand, h m the elasticity of market demand, and e the elasticity of fringe supply. Let S and (1 − S) represent the market shares for the dominant fi rm and fringe fi rms, respectively. In the context of the dominant fi rm model, the Lerner Index becomes:
The elasticity of residual demand (h r ) is a function of the elasticity of the market demand (h m ), the elasticity of the fringe supply (e), and the share of the market controlled by the dominant fi rm. It can be shown algebraically that h r is related to h m , e, and S as follows: The Lerner Index for a dominant fi rm facing a competitive fringe is decreasing with e and the absolute value of h m . That is, for more elastic fringe supply or market demand, the Index is smaller. The Index is increasing with the market share of the dominant fi rm. As S increases, so does l. As the above equation illustrates, however, market share is not the only determinant of market power. As in a model of pure monopoly, the Lerner Index will not measure the degree of power that a dominant fi rm exerts over the consumers and the fringe fi rms. Instead, it measures the monopolist's relative markup taking into account the presence of the fringe. The next section examines how the courts have tried to resolve this and other discrepancies between theoretical and practical understandings of monopoly power.
IV. Monopoly power in antitrust law
The Supreme Court held in du Pont (the Cellophane case) that '[m]onopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition'. 20 The Court's use of 'or' rather than 'and' has caused some confusion in practice. Based on this single sentence, which is taken out of context, some may believe that one can establish the fact of monopoly power by simply showing that a dominant fi rm can exclude some competition or exert some control over price. This belief is misguided. Over the last half century, the courts have become increasingly sophisticated in their understanding of what constitutes monopoly power.
From an economic perspective, monopoly power refers to the ability of a fi rm to raise prices above the competitive level and thereby earn more profi t. For antitrust purposes, however, a successful plaintiff will have to prove that monopoly power exists. This, of course, can be accomplished with direct or circumstantial evidence.
Direct evidence
A plaintiff can prove the existence of monopoly power by showing that the defendant raised price substantially above the competitive level or actually excluded some of its competitors. This is often hard to do. For example, showing that price is above the competitive level may be ambiguous. A perfectly competitive market that is in disequilibrium will have prices that exceed the long-run competitive equilibrium price. Prices will equal short-run marginal cost, but may far exceed average cost. Even in equilibrium, infra-marginal fi rms will enjoy excess profi ts due to their superior effi ciency, better location, or more astute management.
The exclusion of rivals as evidence of monopoly power is often problematic as well. Some rivals exclude themselves because they are less effi cient or otherwise poorly managed. As a policy matter, we are concerned with the exclusion of equally effi cient fi rms. Ineffi cient fi rms should be on their own.
Circumstantial evidence
Over the years, the most prominent piece of circumstantial evidence has been market share. In Alcoa, the Court found that a share of 90 per cent was conclusive proof of monopoly. 21 Although market share may not be dispositive, it has been relied upon by many courts and endorsed by the Supreme Court. In Grinnell, 22 for example, the Court found it reasonable to infer monopoly power from a predominant share of the market. In the Cellophane case, the Court noted that a market share of 75 per cent constituted monopoly.
23 Somewhat more recently, the Supreme Court found that an 80 per cent market share provided an adequate foundation for an inference of monopoly power. 24 This, of course, raises the question of thresholds. As a general proposition, a market share above 70 per cent creates a rebuttable presumption of monopoly power, while a market share below 50 per cent usually precludes an inference of monopoly power. 25 For cases involving a dominant fi rm with market share between 50 and 70 per cent, there have been varying judicial decisions.
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The problem with relying solely on market share is easy to show. Suppose a fi rm has a market share of 70 per cent and, therefore, is presumed to have monopoly power. At fi rst blush, this does not seem unreasonable. After all, a fi rm wields monopoly power by reducing output and thereby increasing price. But suppose that the absolute value of the elasticity of demand (h m ) equals 2 and the elasticity of fringe supply (e f ) is also equal to 2. In that event, the Lerner Index will be:
In other words, by unilaterally reducing output, the dominant fi rm will be able to elevate price until marginal cost is 27 per cent below price. Suppose another fi rm has a market share of 40 per cent and, therefore, is presumed to have no monopoly power. If the absolute value of the demand elasticity is 1.25 and the fringe supply elasticity is 0.25, the Lerner Index will be:
0.40 1.25 1 0. 25(0.60) 5 0.29
In this case, the fi rm with a 40 per cent market share has more monopoly power than the fi rm with a 70 per cent market share.
The problem of product diff erentiation According to the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Merger Guidelines, 27 if a fi rm can profi tably raise its price by 5 per cent above the competitive level, that product constitutes a relevant antitrust market. If it is the only producer, presumably that fi rm would be a monopolist. The problem is that this may characterize a wide array of fi rms in industries marked by product diff erentiation and substantial rivalry. In monopolistically competitive industries, equilibrium market prices may be equal to average cost, but they will be above marginal cost. 28 Since competitive prices are equal to marginal cost, equilibrium involves supracompetitive pricing. Generally, however, this is of no antitrust significance. 29 Restructuring such markets would be futile because these results are the natural consequences of product diff erentiation, which provides choice to consumers.
Importance of entry barriers
Responsible managers act in the interest of the shareholders who own the company. In doing so, they will maximize the fi rm's profi ts on behalf of those shareholders who will benefi t from higher dividends and appreciation in the market value of their shares. 30 In order to maximize profi t, the manager must exercise the market power that the fi rm possesses. 31 The economic profi t that the fi rm earns will attract the interest of those outside the industry as they would like to dip into that pot of gold. Entry by those fi rms will lead to competition and an erosion of monopoly power. Consequently, for monopoly power to be more than a temporary bump in an otherwise competitive road, there must be some barriers to entry. 32 As a general proposition, an entry barrier can be defi ned as a cost that new entrants must bear that the incumbent did not (or does not) have to bear. 33 Alternatively, we may defi ne an entry barrier as an advantage that an incumbent fi rm enjoys over potential entrants. 34 There is some disagreement among economists about which defi nition is most useful. For our purposes, we only want to point out that low entry barriers, however defi ned, will shorten a monopolist's tenure. In contrast, high entry barriers mean that monopoly (or market) power will persist, as will its exercise and its eff ect on social welfare.
Courts consider evidence of barriers to entry in determining the existence of monopoly power. If there are no substantial barriers to entry, courts are apt to fi nd no monopoly power. This, of course, is suitable from an economic perspective; prices and profi ts above the competitive level will attract entry, and the resulting competition will reduce both. Conversely, substantial entry barriers support an inference of monopoly power based on market share because they will insulate the fi rm from competition.
Many things have been characterized as entry barriers. These include high capital costs, limited supplies of critical inputs, long-term supply contracts, legal licenses, network eff ects, intellectual property, 35 and brand names, among others. The problem with some of these so-called entry barriers is that they were earned by the incumbent. For example, any consumer preference for computers with 'Intel Inside' was earned by Intel through years of producing high-quality microprocessors. Rivals can compete with an established brand by off ering high quality products, pricing aggressively, and being a reliable source of supply. Similarly, high capital costs are not unique to the entrant. The incumbent also incurred high capital costs along with the associated risks of its investments. Capital costs are only an entry barrier if potential entrants cannot get access to the necessary capital due to some form of market imperfection. Otherwise, entrants must incur those costs just as the incumbent did. In some industries, network eff ects may be pronounced. Entry may be diffi cult if an incumbent has substantial market penetration; in that case, an entrant's product will not have much value until it has been accepted by a critical mass of consumers. This creates a chicken-and-egg situation. A fi rm will not fi nd entry attractive unless it expects a large customer base, but potential customers will not purchase the entrant's product unless it has a large customer base.
In some instances, courts have considered the presence of supracompetitive prices and profi ts as proof of monopoly power. The most prominent problem with this inference is that price and profi t data come from accounting records, which do not refl ect the economic concept of cost. The accounting costs found in fi nancial statements only tell part of the story, leaving out the implicit opportunity costs of a fi rm's assets and investments. 36 
Importance of market defi nition
Monopoly power does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, it exists in a sensibly defi ned relevant market. If a market is defi ned too narrowly, a fi rm without a meaningful monopoly will be seen as a monopolist. For example, if one examined the 'market' for Burger King's Whopper sandwiches, Burger King would appear to be a monopolist since no one else sells Whoppers. But such a market makes no economic sense because it ignores reasonably close substitutes that are supplied by McDonald's, Wendy's, Hardee's, What-a-Burger, and others. On the other hand, if a market is defi ned too broadly, a fi rm with substantial monopoly power will be seen to have none. For example, if ready-to-eat breakfast cereal, which has been defi ned as a relevant market, 37 were produced by a single fi rm, that fi rm would be a monopolist. If the relevant market were defi ned as all foods that people eat for breakfast, the breakfast cereal monopolist would be seen as competing with the producers of hot cereals, donuts and other pastries, eggs and various breakfast meats, potatoes, pancakes, French toast, cold pizza, apple pie, and a host of other products.
For antitrust purposes, the courts have recognized that market definition is critical in proving monopoly power. In Walker Process, for example, the Supreme Court observed that '[w]ithout a defi nition of [the relevant] market, there is no way to measure [a fi rm's] ability to lessen or destroy competition'. 38 The Supreme Court's Grinnell standard clearly requires proof of the relevant market. 39 The Supreme Court's ruling in Spectrum Sports also makes it very clear that market defi nition is an essential element in § 2 cases.
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V. Concluding remarks
The power a monopolist wields resides in its ability to raise price above the competitive level, which it accomplishes by producing a suboptimal quantity of output. A natural signal of monopoly power, then, is the Lerner Index. The Lerner Index demonstrates the extent to which a monopolist can increase price above the competitive level and thereby earn greater profi t. The Lerner Index alone, however, cannot communicate the degree of monopoly power enjoyed by a fi rm. Monopoly power will be infl uenced by the existence of reasonable substitutes, which is why market defi nition is important. Another important consideration is the height of entry barriers, since the durability of a monopolist's power critically depends on the likelihood that new rivals will enter the market. A rigorous economic analysis of monopoly power will look for factors that maintain monopoly power, like thinly distributed substitutes and high entry barriers, in addition to symptoms of monopoly power, like supra-competitive prices. 
Notes
where P is the market-determined price, q is the quantity of output, and C(q) is the fi rm's cost function. Profi t maximization requires producing the quantity where:
Since dC/dq is marginal cost, we have the result that P 5 MC. Performance, 9 (2nd edn, 1980) . 12. Since price declines as quantity increases along the demand curve, total revenue is:
TR 5 P(Q)Q and marginal revenue is by defi nition given by dTR dQ 5 P 1 Q dP dQ
Since dP/dQ is negative (i.e., demand curves are negatively sloped), marginal revenue is less than price: MR , P. 13. For a linear demand, P 5 a − bQ, total revenue is PQ 5 aQ − bQ 2 , and marginal revenue is dPQ/dQ 5 a − 2bQ. Thus, the marginal revenue curve is twice as steep as the demand curve, with the same intercept. 14. Richard A. Posner, The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 Journal of Political Economy 807 (1975) , warns us that the pursuit of monopoly may involve rent seeking activity that is not socially productive. The resources used in this pursuit are wasted as they could have been used to produce something of value to society.
Abba Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1
Review of Economic Studies 157 (1934). 16. Elasticity (h) is a unit-free metric that describes the per cent by which the quantity demanded will change for a given per cent change in price: For some price and quantity, an elasticity less than minus one (h , 21) means that in response to an x percentage decrease in price, the quantity demanded will increase by a percentage greater than x. Conversely, when h is between 21 and 0, an x percentage decrease in price yields an increase in the quantity demanded by a percentage less than x. The elasticity of demand is negative for all goods except Giff en goods, which are a theoretical exception rarely (if ever) encountered in practice. 17. The profi t a maximizing monopolist will produce where:
Dividing both sides by P yields the Lerner Index:
